Land, Power, and the Hungarian Countryside: Fidesz and NER Property Acquisitions

Introduction

Since the Fidesz party’s return to power in 2010, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s associates and members of the Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere (NER) – the “System of National Cooperation” patronage network – have acquired extensive properties across the Hungarian countryside. These include vast agricultural lands, vineyards, luxury villas and hunting lodges, historic castles, and other estates. Investigative journalists and watchdog NGOs have uncovered numerous cases where such acquisitions were facilitated by political influence, opaque financing, public funds, or preferential treatment, often at the expense of local farmers or the public interest. This report details the most controversial examples, and compiles the 20 largest known property acquisitions by Fidesz insiders and NER affiliates (by size or value). All information is sourced from Hungarian investigative outlets (Átlátszó, Direkt36, etc.), international media, and public records.

State Farmland Auctions: “Land for Farmers” or Land for Friends?

One of the biggest land grabs occurred during the state farmland auctions of 2015–2016, a program branded as “Land to the Farmers.” In theory, it was meant to enable local small farmers to buy state-owned fields. In practice, detailed analysis showed that politically connected buyers and large agribusinesses reaped the benefits, often purchasing huge plots at bargain prices. József Ángyán – a former Fidesz agriculture official who turned whistleblower – documented that in county after county, well-connected elites acquired the best lands instead of local family farmers. Notably:

Lőrinc Mészáros (Orbán’s childhood friend, then-mayor of Felcsút) and his family emerged as the single largest beneficiaries nationwide, obtaining about 1,550 hectares of former state land during the auctions. They paid relatively low prices – on average 1.6 million HUF per hectare, often just the minimum bid – far below typical European market values. Much of this was consolidated around Orbán’s home region (Felcsút/Alcsút), as discussed later.
In Csongrád County, the home turf of Fidesz power-broker János Lázár, his close relatives (father, uncle, cousin and in-law) together bought 514 ha – an astonishing 4.3% of all auctioned land in that county. Lázár was then a minister and a key figure in Fidesz’s leadership. Another local insider, Zoltán Besenczy (former deputy mayor of Szentes), and his son acquired 501 ha. Even the wife of a Fidesz MP (Sándor Farkas) picked up 63 ha. Meanwhile, over 70% of Csongrád’s auctioned land was packaged in large tracts (>100 ha) that small farmers could not afford, and 64% of the land sold had no bidding competition (sold at the upset minimum price) – suggesting a de facto rigged process benefiting a few big players.
Similar patterns repeated elsewhere. Independent monitoring by Átlátszó mapped these sales across the country and confirmed that “the biggest beneficiaries of the farmland auctions were Lőrinc Mészáros and his family” alongside other oligarchs close to Fidesz. Opposition party LMP even compared modern “land barons” to historical aristocracy: in some counties, new oligarchs now own more land than 19th-century noble families did. For example, businessman Tamás Leisztinger (an oligarch who later came to terms with the Orbán regime) amassed ~26,000 ha in one county, and OTP Bank CEO Sándor Csányi (another regime ally) controls ~25,000 ha in another – each surpassing the holdings of an Archduke or Count in those areas. (See Table 1 for more on these top landowners.)

Crucially, many successful bidders were not genuine local farmers but politically connected investors. Investigations found instances of “fake farmers” – businesspeople setting up rural addresses to pose as locals – and hinted at kickbacks and insider information in the bidding process. A former agriculture minister, György Raskó, stated that Orbán’s friends were often “positively discriminated” in land deals, creating a “crony economy” in agriculture. The government defended the policy as creating efficient large farms, but small farmers in regions like Hajdú-Bihar complained that “friends of the Fidesz Party got the land… real farmers like us got nothing”.

Financing Favors and Opaque Ownership

Beyond the auctions, subsequent land purchases by officials’ families have raised eyebrows due to preferential financing from state banks and opaque ownership structures:

Antal Rogán’s New Wife – 1,022 ha with a State Loan: In late 2020, Barbara Obrusánszki, the young wife of Cabinet Minister Antal Rogán, quietly acquired 1,022 hectares of farmland in northeastern Hungary (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county) along with her parents. The purchase price (1.665 billion HUF) was almost entirely financed by a 1.58 billion HUF loan from Budapest Bank, a government-controlled bank – meaning the family put down only ~5% equity. Such a 95% loan-to-value ratio is highly unusual in commercial lending, suggesting extraordinary confidence (or influence) was involved. Indeed, this deal was signed just months before her marriage to Rogán was revealed, implying the family anticipated powerful backing. Watchdog reporters noted that a separate 315 million HUF loan was also given to a company linked to Mrs. Rogán’s father around the same time. The sellers of the land later told journalists they had “no idea” the buyer was connected to Rogán. The arrangement exemplifies how public resources (a state bank loan) facilitated a massive land acquisition by a political insider’s family.
János Lázár’s Family and the Batida Estate: János Lázár – the same Fidesz heavyweight whose family scored big in the 2015 auctions – has since continued expanding his landholdings around a hunting lodge in Batida, near his hometown of Hódmezővásárhely. In 2021 it came to light that Lázár (by then an MP and government commissioner) agreed to buy another parcel for 57.2 million HUF next to the lodge, financing 90% of the price (45.8 million) with a loan from Takarékbank. Notably, Takarékbank is partly owned by a close friend of Orbán (Lőrinc Mészáros has been involved in its ownership), raising questions of preferential treatment. Lázár only put in 10% from his own pocket. His asset declarations revealed significant debts and stakes in the hunting lodge company, yet banks seemed eager to lend. Meanwhile, investigative reports uncovered that the Batida hunting lodge itself – a grand complex resembling a “hunting castle” – was built in the mid-2010s by a secretive attorney (Jenő Kulik) closely linked to Lázár. The project was facilitated by tailored local zoning changes while Lázár was mayor, though he denied direct involvement. Surrounding the lodge, Lázár’s mother and even his young children acquired over 40 hectares of land, effectively controlling the area. In fact, the lodge is built on a 3,000 m² parcel but is encircled by 1.8 ha owned by Lázár’s mother, plus adjacent plots belonging to Lázár himself and his sons – a patchwork that secures the family’s influence over the entire estate. In one absurd twist, a public road built with municipal funds was later fenced into the private lodge grounds; Lázár’s company now pays a token 2.7 million HUF annual “rent” for that road. This case illustrates how a powerful official leveraged both insider access to credit and municipal authority to build a rural domain.
Other Politician-Family Land Deals: Numerous lower-profile Fidesz figures have also become “földesúr” (landlord) MPs. For example, Sándor Farkas (Fidesz MP and agriculture official) went from 51 ha to 113 ha of land within a year, entering the top tier of landowning legislators. Erik Bánki, Balázs Győrffy, Zsolt Szabó, and others have likewise accumulated hundreds of hectares combined, often while overseeing agriculture policy. In another notable instance, Orbán’s own daughter Ráhel Orbán has been buying up prime vineyards in the Tokaj wine region: in 2023 she acquired 60 hectares of Tokaj vineyards for 327 million HUF, and also another 34 hectares that were previously held by the Orbán family’s winery company. These transactions – between relatives and with little public disclosure – underscore how the Orbán family itself is establishing an empire in agriculture (in this case, premium wine country).

Buying Up the Countryside: Lake Balaton and Beyond

The Hungarian elite’s countryside acquisitions are not limited to farmland – they also encompass valuable resort areas and scenic real estate, especially around Lake Balaton, the country’s largest lake and a tourism hotspot. In recent years, oligarchs close to Fidesz have engaged in what local media dub the “Balaton land rush,” snapping up vineyards, waterfront properties, and entire tourist facilities.

Farmland with a View – Tihany Peninsula: In 2022, Atlatszo revealed that Lőrinc Mészáros Jr. (son of the billionaire tycoon) purchased a significant parcel classified as “meadow and farm building” in Tihany – one of Lake Balaton’s most picturesque villages – for roughly 300 million HUF. The contract was posted locally (against the buyer’s wishes) and showed Mészáros Jr. as a “farmer” buying farmland – yet on that same hillside, luxury villas and pools have been springing up under the guise of “agricultural structures”. In fact, multiple lavish vacation homes in Tihany’s protected peninsula have exploited looser rules by getting permits as “storage barns” or “water reservoirs”, effectively skirting zoning laws. The Mészáros plot offers a panoramic lake view and is part of an area (Óvár) where “luxury houses have been built on farmland recently due to not very strict regulations”. This purchase is emblematic of how agricultural land near Balaton is repurposed for high-end development by those with connections, often to the detriment of environmental and heritage protections.
Vineyards and Wineries: Prominent Fidesz figures have also acquired vineyards around Balaton’s uplands (a region famous for wine). For instance, MP Kristóf Szatmáry moved to buy a tract of vineyards in Mindszentkálla, while government advisor István Sárhegyi and attorney Balázs Rábely targeted vineyard land in Balatoncsicsó. These transactions underscore a trend: the governing elite “continue buying up hectares of land around Lake Balaton”, aiming to control not just tourism but also agricultural production (wine) in this lucrative area.
Resorts and Hotels – the Balaton Oligarch Monopoly: Perhaps the most high-profile Balaton acquisition has been Club Aliga in Balatonvilágos – a sprawling 50-hectare lakeside resort that once served as the Communist leaders’ vacation retreat. In 2018, a company controlled by Lőrinc Mészáros acquired a 74.99% stake in Club Aliga’s holding company. Through a complex deal, Mészáros’s listed firm Appeninn Nyrt became the owner, and István Tiborcz (Orbán’s son-in-law) also indirectly gained a share via his BDPST Group’s stake in Appeninn. Club Aliga is considered “one of the most valuable pieces of real estate around Lake Balaton”, and its takeover by NER interests sparked public outcry over potential restricted access and luxury redevelopment on what was quasi-public beachfront. Similarly, in the town of Keszthely, two landmark lakefront hotels – the Hullám Hotel and Hotel Helikon – were bought by Tiborcz’s BDPST in the late 2010s. (They were later sold to another investor, but only after significant value increase.) Through allies like Mészáros, the Orbán circle also came to control Balatontourist, the largest camping and resort chain around the lake. These moves have effectively consolidated Balaton’s tourism infrastructure in the hands of a few government-aligned businessmen.
Nature Reserves for a Song: The pattern even extends to protected landscapes. In 2017, two large hillside plots (total ~0.4 hectares) in the Buda Hills near Budapest – part of the Pilis nature conservation area – were sold by a state forestry company to Gellért Jászai, a longtime Mészáros business partner. The land came with a historic villa and a cottage. Astonishingly, Jászai’s company paid only 100 million HUF (≈ €330,000) for the estate, a fraction of market value for such prime real estate. An Atlatszo investigation found conflict of interest in the sale: the state forestry’s board, chaired by József Vörös – who happens to be Mészáros’s personal lawyer – approved the deal instead of the management. Vörös had even represented Mészáros at land auctions and helped him acquire the Hatvanpuszta estate (see next section). Moreover, Jászai’s firm Páfrány 15 Kft. was founded just after the tender deadline – it didn’t legally exist when the bid was submitted. The forestry board oddly accepted Jászai’s personal bid and let him form a company later to complete the purchase. All these signs point to an arranged sale favoring a regime insider, whereby state assets in a protected area were alienated cheaply to Orbán’s circle. (Jászai, notably, has since become one of the chief executives in Mészáros’s business empire.)

Castles, Manors, and Luxury Estates

From baroque castles to aristocratic manor houses, a number of historic countryside mansions have ended up in the hands of Fidesz-linked investors. These trophy properties often require costly renovations, but owning them carries prestige – and the expectation of future tourism income or exclusive use. Several acquisitions have drawn scrutiny:

The Schossberger Castle in Tura, a 19th-century manor that was acquired by István Tiborcz’s company. Once dilapidated (as seen above), it is now being transformed into a luxury hotel.

Tura Castle (Schossberger Mansion): In late 2015, a newly formed company (TRA Real Estates Kft.) purchased the famous but long-abandoned castle in Tura (Pest county) for 200 million HUF (≈ €640,000). It soon emerged that this company was backed by István Tiborcz, Orbán’s son-in-law, who had recently refocused from controversial public contracts to private real estate development. Court records uncovered by journalists showed that Tiborcz personally paid the incorporation fee for TRA and that the paperwork was handled by a law firm of Endre Hamar – a close friend of Tiborcz. In other words, Tiborcz was behind the “mysterious” buyer of the Tura mansion. The Neo-Renaissance castle (built in 1883) had starred in films but remained in decay for decades due to the enormous cost of refurbishment. Tiborcz’s company kept its ownership secret for years via the BDPST Group, but eventually announced an ambitious plan: 4.5 billion HUF would be invested to convert Tura Castle into a five-star hotel. (The castle, now restored as the BOTANIQ Castle, indeed opened as a luxury event venue and hotel in 2021.) While the revitalization is positive for the castle’s fate, the initial deal raised concerns as an example of Orbán’s family quietly acquiring national heritage sites through shell firms.

Aerial view of major construction underway at Hatvanpuszta – a historic manor estate near Felcsút. Once an imperial farm, it is now owned by Viktor Orbán’s father and being redeveloped on a lavish scale.

Hatvanpuszta Estate (Orbán Family’s Hidden Manor): Perhaps no property is more emblematic of the NER’s countryside ambitions than the Hatvanpuszta manor in Alcsútdoboz. This sprawling estate (13 hectares of grounds) was once an archduke’s model farm, part of the Habsburgs’ Alcsút estate. In 2011, after Fidesz took power, Győző Orbán (the Prime Minister’s father) bought Hatvanpuszta through his company. He then leased it to Lőrinc Mészáros for 10 years – with Mészáros’s rent reportedly covering the purchase price. This opaque arrangement effectively transferred the estate into the Orbán/Mészáros circle. Around the same time, surrounding lands that had been state-owned were snapped up by Mészáros and others close to Orbán, via leases and the 2015–16 auctions. Atlatszo found that over 500 ha around Hatvanpuszta ended up under Mészáros’s ownership – creating a contiguous dominion. For years, Hatvanpuszta was quiet, known mainly as the place rumored to house Orbán’s pet dogs. But after 2018, massive construction works began. Drone footage in 2019 captured an extensive redevelopment: old farm buildings were gutted, and new structures sprang up, including a huge modern mansion, underground garages (1200 m² worth), a 40-meter tunnel, a grand library wing, and other luxe features. The project – estimated at 3–4 billion HUF in cost – is effectively turning the site into a private countryside palace. Critics allege that this is Viktor Orbán’s secret estate – a personal luxury retreat built indirectly with wealth channeled through his family and Mészáros. Orbán has denied direct involvement, quipping that in his family “children don’t interfere in their parents’ matters”. The official claim is that it’s a business venture of Orbán’s father. Yet the extreme secrecy (e.g. new drone legislation hindering journalists) and the scale of opulence (e.g. a two-story atrium library and chapel on site) suggest otherwise. As of 2023, the Orbán family even expanded Hatvanpuszta by buying adjacent parcels (25 ha) for 68 million HUF, reinforcing that this estate will remain in the Orbán dynasty. Hatvanpuszta illustrates how publicly-funded success (Mészáros’s fortune from state contracts) converts into private luxury realty for the Prime Minister’s family.
Other Notable Castle/Manor Deals: Beyond Tura and Hatvanpuszta, several other historic properties have connections to Fidesz-allied investors. The Borostyán (Ivory) Castle in southwestern Hungary was bought by a company tied to Minister Lajos Kósa’s family, though later sold amid scandal. In neighboring countries, Hungarian oligarchs have even started purchasing castles – e.g., a foundation linked to Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s staff bought two mansions in Slovakia and a castle in Romania for conversion to hotels, using Hungarian public funds to expand the NER’s influence beyond borders. Back at home, the acquisitions of minor castles and manor houses by inscrutable companies (often registered to elderly proxies or small towns) have drawn scrutiny from MP Ákos Hadházy, who suspects laundering of EU funds in some cases. While not all such deals can be linked directly to top Fidesz figures, the pattern of “stróman” (straw man) owners suggests attempts to mask the real beneficiaries – likely people in the government’s orbit.

Top 20 Largest Rural Acquisitions by Fidesz/NER Figures

The table below summarizes twenty of the largest known property acquisitions in the Hungarian countryside by Fidesz politicians, their family members, or NER-associated oligarchs. These are ranked roughly by scale (land area or monetary value). Some entries are individual land purchases; others represent the cumulative holdings of key individuals. Each entry notes the asset, the known buyer/owner, and relevant details:

Property / Asset	Buyer / Affiliated Figure	Size / Value	Year	Notes & Source
Csongrád County Farmland (multiple tracts)	Tamás Leisztinger – businessman (NER-aligned)	~26,000 ha	2010s	Largest landowner in Csongrád; exceeds historical Károlyi estate.
Baranya County Farmland (multiple tracts)	Sándor Csányi – OTP Bank CEO (ally)	~25,000 ha	2010s	Major agribusiness (Bonafarm). More land than Archduke Friedrich.
Mezort Zrt. (various farms)	Zsolt Nyerges – ex-Simicska ally	~18,000 ha	2010s	Land in western Hungary (Simicska’s former empire).
Csákvár Region Farmland (Fejér)	Tibor Zászlós – agribusiness figure	~9,000 ha	2010s	Huge estates near Csákvár; more than Count Esterházy had.
Felcsút/Alcsút Area Farmland	Lőrinc Mészáros & family	~5,400 ha	2010s	Around Orbán’s village; rivaling Habsburg Palatine’s lands.
State Farmland (Various counties)	Lőrinc Mészáros & family	1,550 ha	2015–16	Won in state auctions (biggest single family share).
Borsod County Farmland Package	Barbara Rogán (Obrusánszki) – Minister Rogán’s wife	1,022 ha	2020	Bought with 95% state bank loan. Controversial financing.
Csongrád Auction Lands (Hódmezővásárhely)	Lázár Family (relatives of J. Lázár)	514 ha	2015–16	Purchased by Lázár’s father, uncle, etc. (4.3% of county sale).
Csongrád Auction Lands (Szentes)	Zoltán Besenczy (ex-mayor) & son	501 ha	2015–16	Key auction winners in county (non-local buyers).
Club Aliga Resort (Balatonvilágos)	L. Mészáros / I. Tiborcz (Appeninn)	50 ha resort; stake ~ €20m est.	2017–18	Iconic Balaton resort (75% stake acquired). Public beach access disputed.
Helikon & Hullám Hotels (Keszthely)	István Tiborcz (BDPST Group)	2 grand hotels (100+ rooms each)	2017	Purchased via shell companies. Later sold after uplift in value.
Hatvanpuszta Estate (Alcsútdoboz)	Győző Orbán (PM’s father)	13 ha core estate; 500+ ha area	2011, 2015–23	Historic manor bought 2011; huge reconstruction (3–4 bn HUF) ongoing. Surrounding farms acquired by Mészáros.
Schossberger Castle (Tura)	István Tiborcz (Orbán’s son-in-law)	1.7 ha castle park; 4,500 m² castle	2015	Purchased for 200m HUF via shell firm; 4.5bn HUF renovation planned (now Botaniq Castle hotel).
Batida Hunting Lodge & Environs	János Lázár & family	3,000 m² lodge + ~40 ha land	2015–21	High-end hunting lodge built by Lázár’s ally; Lázár’s mother & children own surrounding lands. Public road privatized.
Nature Reserve Plots (Pilis Hills)	Gellért Jászai (Mészáros partner)	0.4 ha land with villa	2017	Bought for 100m HUF (underpriced). State forestry chair (also Mészáros’s lawyer) approved sale.
Tokaj Vineyards (multiple villages)	Ráhel Orbán (PM’s daughter)	60 ha + 34 ha (94 ha total)	2023	Two large vineyard purchases for ~327m HUF. Expands Orbán family winery holdings.
Balaton Uplands Vineyards	Kristóf Szatmáry (MP), István Sárhegyi, etc.	~20 ha (various small plots)	2020–22	Series of vineyard purchases in Káli Basin (Mindszentkálla, Balatoncsicsó) by Fidesz insiders.
“Stork Nest” Villa (Budapest Orbánhegy)	István Tiborcz (BDPST)	~1,500 m² plot with villa	2017	BDPST bought posh Buda hillside property; now a luxury home/office. Co-owned with Orbán-allied bankers.
Mahart Dock House (Budapest)	István Tiborcz & Andy Vajna	~4,000 m² historic building	2018	Joint venture with late film commissioner Vajna. Not countryside, but notable city acquisition.
Postabank Palace (Budapest)	István Tiborcz & Adnan Polat	8,000 m² downtown building	2016	Bought then flipped to Pharaon, a wanted Saudi businessman. (An example of opaque international deals by NER figures.)

Table 1: Major countryside (and selected Budapest) property acquisitions by Fidesz/NER figures. Land areas are approximate; some values are estimates. Sources: investigative reports by Atlatszo, Direkt36, Index.hu, etc., as cited.

As the table and cases above show, Fidesz-linked individuals have become some of Hungary’s largest landowners and property magnates in little more than a decade. Public tenders and privatizations often ended in the hands of those in Orbán’s inner circle. Money from state contracts, loans from state banks, and EU subsidies (e.g. farm payments that reward large land size) all helped finance this transfer of wealth from public to private hands. Meanwhile, small farmers and ordinary citizens have frequently been sidelined – whether losing land lease competitions, facing restricted access to lakeshores, or simply being outbid by well-connected buyers.

Conclusion

The acquisition of agricultural lands, country estates, villas, and castles by Fidesz party members and NER oligarchs is not merely a series of private business deals – it reflects the entrenchment of a new landed elite under Hungary’s authoritarian-populist regime. These patterns are often compared to a new feudalism: as one opposition MP quipped, “today’s feudal lords possess more land than the aristocrats of past centuries”. What sets this modern land oligarchy apart is the central role of the state in creating it – through policies that favor loyalists, insider knowledge of development plans, financing by taxpayer-funded banks, and occasionally the direct sale of state assets at knock-down prices.

Investigative journalism (by outlets like Átlátszó and Direkt36) and civil society watchdogs (like K-Monitor) continue to shine light on these dealings, bringing some measure of transparency. However, the ultimate ownership structures are often layered behind new companies, relatives, and friends, making accountability difficult. The Hungarian government officially denies any wrongdoing, maintaining that all sales and loans are legal and aimed at strengthening the rural economy. Yet the concentration of land and luxury property in the hands of a few politically-connected individuals raises valid concerns about corruption, nepotism, and the erosion of equal opportunity in Hungary’s countryside.

As of 2025, with Fidesz’s power intact, the trend of NER affiliates buying up land and landmark properties is likely to continue. Public pressure and EU scrutiny (for example, OLAF’s investigations into EU funds misuse) might slow the most egregious cases, but reversing this concentration of wealth would require political change. In the meantime, the castles, mansions, and farmlands of rural Hungary stand as bricks-and-mortar evidence of how closely land, money, and power are intertwined in the Orbán era.

Sources: Hungarian investigative media (Átlátszó, Direkt36, 444.hu), international reports (Euronews, Bloomberg, etc.), NGO databases (K-Monitor), and public records (land registry data and company filings). All factual claims are supported by the cited sources in brackets throughout the text.

Development and Structure of Hungary’s Government-Controlled Propaganda Media (1990s–2025)

Historical Overview (1990s–2000s) – Post-Communist Pluralism and Political Influence

After the fall of communism in 1989, Hungary’s media landscape opened up to private ownership and foreign investment, leading to a pluralistic boom in the 1990s. Early on, however, a “media war” emerged as political parties vied to influence especially the public broadcasters. Control over state television and radio tended to shift with each election: newly elected governments routinely purged and replaced public media leadership and staff with partisan loyalists. This cyclical “changing of the guards” in public media continued through the 1990s and 2000s, with left-liberal and right-nationalist governments alternately dismissing each other’s appointees. Despite these tussles over state media, the broader private media sector flourished with diverse ownership – including significant foreign media companies – and a wide variety of viewpoints remained available throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Several structural reforms shaped this era. A 1996 media law established a pluralistic National Radio and Television Board (ORTT) to regulate broadcasting, enabling the launch of Hungary’s first national private TV channels in 1997 (RTL Klub and TV2, both initially under foreign owners). Foreign investors like Axel Springer, Ringier, and others owned many newspapers and magazines, ensuring editorial independence from direct government control. By the early 2000s, Hungary enjoyed a reputation for relatively free media in the region. Still, political influence persisted: each government treated public service media as a political prize, and behind the scenes, parties forged ties with friendly media proprietors. For example, during Viktor Orbán’s first term as Prime Minister (1998–2002), his ally Lajos Simicska (a Fidesz party co-founder) quietly began building a media base for the right, including acquiring the daily Magyar Nemzet and later founding the news channel Hír TV (launched in 2003). These early efforts set the stage for more extensive media manipulation in the next decade, but genuine media pluralism endured up to the late 2000s – a reality confirmed by observers who noted that before 2010 “the existence of diversity in information sources was undisputed, irrespective of the government’s political affiliation”.

Viktor Orbán’s Return (2010) – Launching an “Illiberal” Media System

When Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party returned to power with a parliamentary supermajority in 2010, it marked a turning point for Hungary’s media system. All previous democratic governments had attempted to shape the media to serve their political interests, but “none had acquired as much capacity, power and ambition as Viktor Orbán’s coalition” elected in 2010. Orbán viewed media as a “battlefield” occupied by hostile forces since his shock election loss in 2002. Determined to prevent a critical press from threatening his agenda, Orbán’s government moved swiftly in 2010 to rewrite media laws, restructure regulatory institutions, and assert control over public and private outlets.

New Media Laws and Regulatory Changes (2010–2011)

One of the Orbán government’s first major acts was passing a new comprehensive Media Act in 2010, which took effect on January 1, 2011. This law created a highly centralized regulatory authority and was a foundational building block of Orbán’s envisioned “illiberal democracy”. It merged oversight of all media (broadcast, print, online) under a new umbrella regulator – the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) – and its decision-making arm, the Media Council. Crucially, the law allowed Orbán’s party to stack these bodies with loyalists: the NMHH president (who also chairs the Media Council) is appointed by the government for a nine-year term, far outlasting a normal electoral cycle. Indeed, the first NMHH head was Annamária Szalai, a former Fidesz MP, succeeded later by another longtime Fidesz affiliate, Mónika Karas. Fidesz used its two-thirds majority to eliminate the previous multi-party nomination system, ensuring “no one other than their own candidates” sit on the Media Council.

At the same time, Orbán’s media law radically reorganized public service media. It amalgamated the state broadcasters – Magyar Televízió (MTV), Duna TV, and Magyar Rádió – under a new centralized holding, the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA). All assets and budgets of the erstwhile public channels were transferred to MTVA, ending their independent management. Thousands of public media employees were reassigned under this single MTVA umbrella. In practice, this meant news content was centralized: rather than each public TV or radio channel producing its own news, a single news center produces uniform content that is distributed across all state channels. The Media Act thus “marked the end of the economic independence” of Hungary’s public broadcasters. From 2011 onward, public TV and radio effectively became arms of the government communications machinery, funded by the state and directed by Fidesz-appointed managers.

These sweeping changes sparked international alarm. European institutions and press freedom watchdogs decried the new law’s broad regulatory powers and its threats to independent journalism. In response to EU pressure, the government made cosmetic tweaks (for example, softening some of the most draconian fining provisions), but “stuck to the passages that – in the long run – proved pivotal for media capture”. By cementing one-party control over regulation and public media, Orbán ensured that from 2010 onward, all key decisions on licensing, frequency allocation, and public-content oversight were politicized in Fidesz’s favor. The stage was set for a systematic takeover of Hungary’s media sphere.

Expansion of Pro-Government Media Ownership (2010–2014)

Parallel to regulatory change, Orbán and his allies moved to reshape ownership of private media. In the early 2010s, many private outlets were still owned by independent or foreign companies. Orbán perceived these as “enemy territory” in the media war. With encouragement from the top, Fidesz-linked oligarchs began acquiring or establishing outlets to build a loyal media empire.

During 2010–2014, a central figure was still Lajos Simicska, Orbán’s longtime friend and party finance chief. Simicska had quietly expanded a pro-Fidesz media portfolio which included the daily Magyar Nemzet, the news channel Hír TV, and the popular free metro paper Metropol. Once Fidesz was back in power, Simicska leveraged his influence: Fidesz placed loyalists atop major state-owned companies, which then funneled lavish government advertising to Simicska’s media outlets. This provided a steady, state-subsidized revenue stream to the Fidesz-friendly press. By these means, Simicska’s companies – ostensibly private – prospered and amplified government messaging. For instance, the free tabloid Metropol achieved a virtual monopoly in Budapest’s public transport kiosks, buoyed by state advertisements, and reliably echoed the government line.

At the same time, other cooperative media owners were courted. The broadsheet Magyar Hírlap, for example, required little persuasion: its owner Gábor Széles was an ardent conservative who “kept bankrolling the paper” hoping for influence in Orbán’s government. Magyar Hírlap thus became an early pro-government mouthpiece. The venerable Magyar Nemzet – under editor Gábor Liszkay (a confidant of Orbán and Simicska) – took a lead in orchestrating smear campaigns against opponents. It was in Magyar Nemzet’s pages that NGOs, liberal intellectuals, and opposition figures were first targeted with vilifying stories, helping create a narrative of a nation under threat from “liberal elites”. The paper also served as a platform to mobilize Fidesz’s base: for example, a government-aligned civic group announced the first pro-Orbán “Peace March” in Magyar Nemzet, rallying supporters against alleged foreign meddling. By 2014, Magyar Nemzet had become “the central conduit of the government’s narrative”, making it a strategically vital asset.

Fidesz’s consolidation of media power also extended to broadcasting. Both nationwide commercial TV stations (RTL Klub and TV2) were foreign-owned in 2010 (RTL by Germany’s Bertelsmann, TV2 by ProSiebenSat.1). Orbán’s circle viewed these popular entertainment channels with suspicion, seeing them as controlled by a “liberal Budapest elite” disloyal to national conservatives. While RTL Klub remained profitable and editorially independent, TV2 was struggling financially and became a takeover target. By 2013–2014, intermediaries tied to Fidesz were maneuvering to buy TV2. A controversial advertising tax introduced in 2014 (ostensibly a tax on ad revenues) disproportionately hit RTL Klub, widely seen as punishment for critical news coverage. RTL responded by airing even more exposes of government corruption, prompting Orbán to later compromise and reduce the tax. TV2, on the other hand, was sold in 2015 to Andy Vajna – a Hollywood producer-turned Orbán ally – with generous financing likely facilitated by state banks. Under Vajna, TV2’s news and talk shows were promptly re-tooled to favor the government, turning the station into another propaganda outlet.

By 2014, the emerging pro-government media ecosystem included an array of print, radio, and TV outlets: state-run channels now firmly under Fidesz influence, Simicska’s expanding portfolio, and new entrants backed by Orbán’s allies. The government also ramped up direct funding for friendly media. A Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister (headed by Antal Rogán) was effectively turned into a “Ministry of Communications” overseeing all state advertising expenditures. From 2015 onward, Orbán authorized an annual budget of around 25 billion forints (≈€70 million) specifically for communications campaigns and ads – money overwhelmingly spent on pro-government outlets to ensure their profitability. This massive public spending on ads (e.g. government “information” campaigns, health announcements, and national consultations) became a financial lifeline that kept loyal media afloat while independent outlets received little to no state advertising.

The Simicska Rift and New Oligarchs (2014–2017)

A dramatic shift occurred in 2015 with the falling-out between Orbán and Lajos Simicska. In early 2015, Simicska – long seen as Orbán’s closest oligarch – had a very public rupture with the Prime Minister (the so-called “G-Day” incident, when Simicska lashed out at Orbán). Simicska suddenly turned his media properties (Magyar Nemzet, Hír TV, etc.) from unwavering government cheerleaders into forums often critical of Fidesz. This “media civil war” was a pivotal moment: Orbán moved swiftly to neutralize Simicska’s influence and replace the lost propaganda capacity. The government slapped punitive taxes on Simicska’s companies and used regulatory pressure in an attempt to rein him in. At the same time, Orbán courted Simicska’s top media lieutenants. Notably, Magyar Nemzet’s editor Gábor Liszkay defected and joined the Orbán camp, taking a cohort of pro-Fidesz journalists with him. Simicska responded by rebranding Magyar Nemzet as an explicitly independent, opposition-leaning paper, and Hír TV began airing voices hostile to the government.

Orbán’s administration, fearing what Simicska might reveal or do, poured resources into building an entirely new media empire from 2015 onward. The goal was twofold: recapture Simicska’s former audience and surpass his media holdings with an even larger, omnipresent propaganda machine. To coordinate this effort, Orbán established the Cabinet Office under Antal Rogán as mentioned, giving him oversight of every forint of government advertising. He also enlisted a new cadre of loyalist media owners – a mix of friendly businessmen and confidants – to expand Fidesz’s media reach. Key figures in this new wave included:

Árpád Habony – Orbán’s unofficial adviser, who helped launch new tabloids and online sites (e.g. the free daily Lokál and blog 888.hu) to push Fidesz narratives;
Andy Vajna – who, as noted, acquired TV2 and a nationwide radio network (Radio 1) to create entertainment platforms with a pro-government slant;
Mária Schmidt – a historian and government ally, who took over the weekly Figyelő (formerly a respected business magazine) and turned it into a pro-Fidesz publication;
Lőrinc Mészáros – a former gas-fitter-turned billionaire and childhood friend of Orbán, who began buying up newspapers across the country;
Miklós Ómolnár – founder of the sensationalist tabloid Ripost, which became known for lurid hit pieces smearing opposition figures;
Tamás Szemerey and others, often relatives of top officials, who invested in niche outlets or media startups on behalf of the ruling party.

With this team, pro-government media proliferated rapidly after 2015. New government-friendly tabloids, magazines and online news sites were founded one after another. Perhaps the most consequential development was the consolidation of Hungary’s regional newspapers. In mid-2016, the Austrian investor Heinrich Pecina (via Mediaworks Hungary Zrt.) bought Pannon Lapok Társasága (PLT) – a group of 5 regional daily newspapers – giving Mediaworks control of about half of all county-level newspapers. Rumors swirled that Pecina was merely a front for Fidesz interests (specifically Mészáros). Those suspicions deepened in October 2016 when Mediaworks suddenly shut down Népszabadság – Hungary’s largest opposition-aligned daily and its paper of record. The closure (ostensibly for financial reasons) occurred shortly after Népszabadság published investigative stories embarrassing the government, and it provoked public outcry and protests. Orbán’s government denied involvement, and Mészáros even falsely disavowed interest in Mediaworks at the time. But it later emerged that Orbán had met with Pecina in person prior to these moves, and by late 2016 Pecina sold Mediaworks (with all its papers) to a company controlled by Lőrinc Mészáros. This gave Orbán’s allies direct ownership of a vast swath of the print media, including virtually all regional newspapers. Local news across Hungary fell in line, often running identical front-page stories dictated by the center – eerily echoing the communist-era practice when a party “Agitprop” office sent out the day’s talking points to every county paper.

By 2017, the pro-Fidesz media empire spanned all formats: a state-run TV network and radio network now serving as unabashed propaganda organs, the second-largest commercial TV channel (TV2) under loyal control, nearly all regional newspapers owned by Fidesz-linked businesses, multiple national newspapers and weekly magazines in government-friendly hands, and major online news portals that had been captured or launched by Orbán’s circle (for example, Origo.hu – once independent – was acquired in 2015 by a company led by a former Magyar Telekom executive with Fidesz ties, and promptly transformed into a tabloid-style propaganda site). The few remaining independent outlets – such as the leading online portal Index.hu, newsmagazine HVG, and RTL Klub’s news division – came under intense pressure through legal and economic means, but had not yet been neutralized at that point.

The KESMA Era: Centralized Propaganda Foundation (2018–Present)

Having achieved a third consecutive election victory in April 2018, Viktor Orbán moved to consolidate his media conquests into a single centralized structure. The culmination came in late 2018 with the creation of an umbrella entity: the Central European Press and Media Foundation, known by its Hungarian acronym KESMA (Közép-európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány). In a blitz of coordinated announcements on November 28, 2018, the owners of over **400 pro-government media outlets “donated” their companies to this new foundation. Within days, an astoundingly large media holding was born. KESMA’s portfolio ultimately reached 476 outlets – essentially the entire Fidesz-aligned media universe. It included Mediaworks (with its 19 regional newspapers and many magazines), the entire Magyar Nemzet group (by then back in Fidesz hands after Simicska’s retreat), the popular Origo.hu news site, the Mandiner news portal, Mária Schmidt’s Figyelő, several pro-government tabloids (Lokál, Ripost, 888.hu, etc.), and even a few nominally left-leaning papers that had been bought out by government allies. Virtually every segment of print and online media that had been captured in previous years was folded into KESMA’s structure. Notably, the only major pro-government outlets kept outside KESMA were the TV2 television network, the increasingly subservient Index.hu (whose ownership was maneuvered into Fidesz-friendly hands by 2020), and the state public-service broadcaster MTVA, which remained separate under direct state control.

KESMA was ostensibly a non-profit foundation, but its board of trustees was stacked with Orbán loyalists. Its founding chairman was István Varga, a former Fidesz member of parliament, alongside two other board members who were Orbán’s personal lawyer and a pro-Fidesz “think tank” director. In effect, Orbán’s inner circle now directly managed hundreds of media outlets under one roof. The manner of KESMA’s creation underscored its political purpose: the owners who handed over their media assets (a who’s-who of pro-Orbán oligarchs like Mészáros) received no compensation, emphasizing that these businesses were never run as profit-seeking enterprises but as political tools. To preempt any challenge, the government issued a decree declaring the KESMA merger a matter of “national strategic importance”, thereby exempting it from competition and antitrust scrutiny. This extraordinary move – effectively placing almost the entire private media market under a single partisan entity – was unprecedented in the EU. Freedom House analysts noted that the Hungarian media was “beginning to resemble state media under Communism because of [this] level of control and consolidation”, drawing parallels to the monolithic propaganda apparatus of the one-party era.

By concentrating outlets in KESMA, Orbán eliminated the remaining façades of independent ownership. As one analysis put it, KESMA became the “APO of our times”, referencing the Communist Party’s old agitprop office – equally efficient at “brainwashing average citizens” across all platforms. KESMA also established a centralized financing and content-sharing model. It could pool the hefty influx of state advertising money and other public grants, redistributing funds to keep unprofitable propaganda papers running. It also enabled tighter coordination of editorial content: newspapers under KESMA routinely run identical headlines and talking points, and journalists from different outlets share “one team, one mission” marching orders. The government openly touted this merger as a patriotic initiative. In fact, Orbán, dropping all pretense, publicly boasted that the era of clandestine media deals was over and that the press was now “his personal political instrument”. The creation of KESMA was as much a political statement as an organizational one – declaring total dominance over the media space.

Propaganda Content and Editorial Practices

By the late 2010s, the Hungarian media ecosystem had been largely transformed into a propaganda tool of the government. All major television, radio, print, and online outlets under state or KESMA influence adhere to centrally approved narratives. Editorial independence has been supplanted by explicit directives from Fidesz communications officials. Often, editors and journalists in this network see themselves as “soldiers rather than media professionals”, executing a political mission rather than serving the public interest. Investigations have uncovered that these outlets routinely disseminate false or misleading stories in service of the government’s agenda, even at the cost of violating basic journalistic ethics. Courts have repeatedly ruled, for instance, that the pro-government TV2 network and Origo.hu knowingly fabricated defamatory stories to discredit opposition figures. In 2018 alone – an election year – eight major pro-government outlets (including Origo, Magyar Idők, TV2, Lokál, Ripost, and the state media) were collectively found guilty by courts 109 times for publishing falsehoods, libel or forced corrections. By stark contrast, the leading independent outlets (such as Index, RTL Klub, 444.hu, Magyar Nemzet in its short-lived independent phase, and Átlátszó) together lost only 14 such cases that year. The data underscores how the Fidesz “lakájmédia” (lackey media) serves as a disinformation machine, pumping out smear pieces and conspiracy-laden stories at an industrial scale.

Common propaganda themes dominate government-aligned media across all formats. Since 2015, an anti-migrant, anti-EU, and anti-George Soros narrative has been relentlessly pushed. Leaked audio recordings from inside the state broadcaster MTVA in 2019 revealed editors explicitly instructing journalists that “this institution does not support the opposition” and ordering them to churn out stories “mostly about migrants and Brussels” in line with Fidesz’s campaign messaging. “Whoever is in charge must produce content according to the appropriate narrative… if anyone isn’t prepared to work under these conditions, they can resign,” one senior news editor (Balázs Bende) told his newsroom bluntly. Reporters were directed to take a harsh tone against migrants, LGBTQ issues, and even topics like climate change that the government portrayed as Western plots. These instructions, corroborated by internal emails, laid bare that Hungary’s public media had become an outright propaganda arm, prioritizing political messaging over facts.

The pro-government media’s smear campaigns have targeted a wide range of individuals and groups deemed threatening to Fidesz. Opposition politicians and their family members are frequent subjects of outrageous accusations – for example, ludicrously blaming an opposition leader’s wife for the death of a newborn, or suggesting prominent critics are agents of foreign powers. Such stories, often entirely fabricated, are splashed across the headlines of multiple KESMA outlets in unison, creating an echo chamber. While courts later force retractions or fines in some cases, the propaganda machine pays those penalties as a minor cost of doing business, and the misleading narratives often stick in the minds of the target audience. The coordination is such that on a given day, nearly all government-aligned TV channels, newspapers, radio shows, and news sites will feature the same “talking points” – whether it’s stoking fear of immigrants, vilifying George Soros as the nation’s puppet-master, or touting the government’s latest economic “victory.” As media analysts note, these outlets have “nothing to do with informing the public and everything to do with manipulating public opinion”.

In addition to domestic propaganda, Hungarian state-aligned media has at times served external influence operations. Observers have pointed out that pro-Orbán outlets often echo Kremlin talking points, especially since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022. Hungarian state TV and newspapers have, for instance, promoted narratives about the West “dragging Hungary into war” and cast doubt on Ukraine’s legitimacy, retransmitting Russian disinformation that undermines the EU and NATO consensus. This alignment with Moscow’s propaganda (despite Hungary being an EU member) is consistent with Orbán’s ideological stance and illustrates how the media apparatus can be used to shape public perception in geopolitically significant ways. Furthermore, the Hungarian government funds media not just domestically but also in neighboring countries (Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, etc.) to influence ethnic Hungarian minorities – blurring the line between supporting Hungarian culture abroad and exporting Fidesz’s political agenda. All these efforts underscore a sophisticated “influence operation”: the media is structured to amplify the ruling party’s narrative at home and even extend its reach beyond Hungary’s borders.

Conclusion: A Consolidated Propaganda Ecosystem

Over the span of three decades, Hungary’s media landscape has transformed from a fledgling post-communist free press into a tightly controlled propaganda ecosystem largely serving the interests of the ruling government. This report has traced that development from the 1990s – when diversity of ownership and opinion still prevailed despite political meddling – to the present day, where a combination of state-owned broadcasters and privately owned but government-loyal outlets dominate all media segments. Particularly since 2010 under Viktor Orbán, an array of legal, regulatory, and economic strategies have been deployed to achieve this dominance: from the creation of a one-party media authority and central funding body (MTVA), to takeovers of major news organizations by Orbán’s allies, to the ultimate consolidation of nearly 500 outlets into the single KESMA foundation in 2018. Public television and radio have been converted into unabashed government mouthpieces, and formerly independent newspapers, websites, and broadcasters have either been brought into the fold or shut down. The few independent voices that remain operate on the periphery, often online, facing constant harassment, funding challenges, and smear campaigns.

The ownership structure of this propaganda machine is now highly centralized and opaque. A handful of Fidesz-linked oligarchs and Orbán confidants sit atop the media holdings, backed by steady infusions of public money (in the form of state advertising and preferential treatment). Editorial practices across the board are synchronized to serve the government’s messaging goals, frequently at the expense of truth and professional standards. From television news that omits dissenting views, to radio programs that mirror the ruling party’s line, to print and online outlets that specialize in character assassination and fearmongering, the content is tightly controlled and politically driven. In effect, Hungary has constructed a 21st-century propaganda system in the heart of the EU – one that a Freedom House researcher said is “reminiscent of the media under Communism” in its unity of control.

The Hungarian media ecosystem has been deliberately structured to serve as a propaganda tool of the government. Through centralized ownership (e.g. KESMA), state funding leverage, legal authority over regulators, and orchestrated editorial strategy, the ruling Fidesz party has achieved near-total dominance over the national narrative. This transformation, especially under Viktor Orbán since 2010, highlights how media freedom can be eroded and a pluralistic press transformed into a machinery of messaging. While a small independent press corps persists in Hungary, the overall landscape in 2025 is one where the government’s voice saturates television, radio, print, and online media – a reality acknowledged by observers who note that “the Orbán government has taken control of most of the country’s press outlets, either directly or indirectly”. The case of Hungary illustrates a modern authoritarian approach to media control: gradual, systematic transformation and consolidation, resulting in a powerful propaganda apparatus that underpins the government’s hold on power.

Sources: Historical and contemporary analyses, media reports, and press freedom watchdogs have been used to compile this report, including English- and Hungarian-language sources that document the legal changes, ownership patterns, and propaganda techniques in Hungary’s media sector, among others. These illustrate the intricate process by which a once-vibrant media environment was subdued into a centrally directed communications empire serving the Hungarian government’s objectives.

Paks II Nuclear Power Plant Project – Investigation

Historical Overview of Paks II Project

Origins and Initial Agreements: Hungary’s plans to expand nuclear capacity date back to the late 2000s. In 2009, the Hungarian Parliament overwhelmingly consented (330 votes to 6) to prepare for new nuclear units at the Paks site. An MVM (state power company) project dubbed the “Lévai Project” began exploring new units, and by 2012 the government established MVM Paks II Ltd. as a dedicated project company. These efforts culminated on 14 January 2014, when Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and President Vladimir Putin oversaw the signing of an intergovernmental agreement for Russia’s Rosatom to build two new reactors (Units 5 and 6) at Paks. Soon after, the Hungarian Parliament approved the Russia–Hungary nuclear cooperation deal (256 votes for, 29 against) and a €10 billion Russian state loan agreement to finance 80% of the project. The loan, to be repaid by 2046, covers the majority of the estimated €12.5 billion construction cost.

Timeline Milestones and Delays: Initially, officials optimistically projected construction to begin by 2018 and reactors online by the mid-2020s. Indeed, Hungary quickly moved forward: by late 2014, implementation contracts were signed between MVM Paks II and Rosatom’s Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company (Atomenergoproekt), an environmental impact assessment was submitted, and the project company was placed under the Prime Minister’s Office for direct oversight. However, the project encountered numerous delays. The European Commission launched investigations in 2015-2016 into several aspects – the no-bid contract for Rosatom (avoiding a tender), potential state aid, and fuel supply arrangements – which put the project on hold. These probes were eventually resolved in Hungary’s favor by 2017, but only after Budapest agreed to significant modifications: e.g. Rosatom’s initial exclusive fuel supply term was limited, Paks II must sell a portion of its electricity on the open market, and profits cannot be used to expand capacity. The European Commission formally approved the project in March 2017, removing a major hurdle.

Despite approval, progress was slow. In 2017, János Süli – former CEO of the existing Paks plant – was appointed as minister without portfolio to oversee Paks II. Site preparation works (groundworks, utilities, service buildings) began by 2018-2019, including a major soil stabilization effort (excavating and refilling the top 20 meters of soil) to meet seismic safety standards. The project’s schedule slipped: the construction license was only applied for in mid-2020 and issued in August 2022 by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority. By then the original timeline was roughly 10 years behind – the first concrete for the reactor base was not poured in 2022 as once hoped, but only received regulatory go-ahead in late 2024. Current plans aim for first unit completion by 2032 and grid connection in the early 2030s.

Political and Scope Changes: Geopolitical upheavals and internal debates have influenced Paks II. In March 2015, the Hungarian parliament (led by Orbán’s Fidesz party) passed a controversial law classifying all project data for 30 years, citing national security. The government argued this was standard in other countries, but critics decried it as a way to conceal corruption. An opposition MP called the secrecy law a “hotbed for corruption” and “the legalization of a gigantic robbery”. The project’s strategic importance also meant its management shifted among political actors. While initially managed under the Prime Minister’s Office and then by Minister Süli, after 2022 oversight moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (led by Péter Szijjártó), reflecting the project’s entwinement with diplomacy.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine cast a new shadow. Although nuclear cooperation was exempted from EU sanctions, there were growing questions even within the Hungarian government about Rosatom’s ability to deliver under the new constraints. In early 2023, internal discussions even floated a “Paks III” plan – having France’s Framatome build a completely separate nuclear plant – which would have effectively sidelined Rosatom’s project. Hungary’s Energy Minister Csaba Lantos showed interest in this backup plan, but Prime Minister Orbán ultimately vetoed it and insisted Paks II with Rosatom must proceed. Orbán’s decision aligned with his long-standing policy of maintaining close energy ties with Russia. Indeed, even as other Central European countries moved to drop Russian nuclear fuel after Ukraine’s invasion, the Orbán government blocked a deal to diversify Paks I’s fuel supply through the U.S. firm Westinghouse, opting instead to stick with (future) French fuel to avoid working with an American supplier.

Recent Developments: To keep Paks II alive amid sanctions and technical hurdles, Hungary and Russia renegotiated the contracts in 2023. Szijjártó met Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev in Moscow (April 2023) to amend the construction and financing agreements so that sanctioned technologies could be sourced differently. (Details were not public, but one key issue was the plant’s control system: originally to be provided by a German-French Siemens–Framatome consortium, but Germany’s government halted Siemens’ involvement in January 2023 due to dual-use technology sanctions. The solution was to let Framatome take on an enlarged role and supply the control system largely via its French operations.) By May 2023, the European Commission approved these contract changes, giving a green light (with some reservations) to move forward. Construction proper is now finally underway: as of early 2025, excavation of the reactor pit is complete and the project prepared to pour first nuclear concrete for Unit 5’s baseplate. Major components are in production – for example, forging of the first reactor pressure vessel began in Russia, and turbine components are being manufactured in France. The target commissioning date for the two new 1,200 MW reactors is around 2032–2035, roughly a decade later than initially planned.

Key Companies and Contractors Involved

Rosatom (Russia): The centerpiece of Paks II is Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation. Under the 2014 agreement, Rosatom was awarded the contract without a competitive tender, a point that drew scrutiny from Brussels. Rosatom is not a single company but a conglomerate; its subsidiary ASE (Atomstroyexport) is serving as the general contractor for Paks II’s construction. Another Rosatom design institute (Nizhny Novgorod Atomenergoproekt) signed the core technical contracts in December 2014. Rosatom’s involvement means Russia is providing the VVER-1200 reactor technology, engineering expertise, and the bulk of financing via Russian state banks. Notably, the €10 billion loan is backed by Russian state institutions, binding Hungary and Russia in a decades-long financial relationship. Rosatom’s commitment extends to supplying nuclear fuel and training staff, though EU oversight ensured fuel supply will eventually be diversified in line with EU competition rules.

MVM Paks II Ltd (Hungary): This is the Hungarian project company (originally a subsidiary of the state power group MVM, later directly state-owned) in charge of implementing Paks II. It acts as the client and owner of the future plant on behalf of the Hungarian government. Paks II Ltd is responsible for licensing, hiring contractors, and overall project management. The company’s leadership has evolved: early on, nuclear engineer Attila Aszódi was government commissioner for Paks II, and by mid-2017 the CEO role passed to István Lenkei, with Dr. György Mészáros as board chairman. (Despite the common surname, György Mészáros is a nuclear industry professional; Lőrinc Mészáros, mentioned later, is not formally part of Paks II Ltd but is connected through private contractors.) The project company ultimately answers to the Hungarian government – its ownership rights were at one point exercised by the Prime Minister’s Office to emphasize the project’s national strategic importance.

Major Foreign Subcontractors: Although Rosatom is the main contractor, Paks II relies on a web of international suppliers for critical components and services, making it a joint East-West enterprise by necessity. A German-French consortium was contracted to supply the Instrumentation & Control (I&C) system – the safety and control electronics of the reactors. This consortium originally included Germany’s Siemens and France’s Framatome. However, due to sanctions sensitivities, Siemens’ part was blocked by the German government in 2023. As a result, Framatome (France) has taken on an expanded role as the primary I&C provider. Framatome (part of the EDF group) was already involved since it had experience equipping the existing Paks reactors with control systems.

Another vital piece of the reactor island is the turbine-generator system. The contract for new steam turbines went to GE Steam Power (formerly Alstom’s nuclear turbine business). In 2022, France’s EDF acquired a stake in this business, meaning the turbines will effectively come from a French-controlled source. This significantly increases French industry’s stake in Paks II. As of 2023, Framatome and EDF’s involvement has aligned France with Hungary as a stakeholder in preventing sanctions on Rosatom – Paris and Budapest both oppose EU measures that would jeopardize the project’s multinational supply chain.

Hungarian Contractors and Partners: The Hungarian government emphasizes that local companies are benefitting from Paks II. Szijjártó noted that 94 Hungarian companies (alongside numerous American, German, French, Swedish, and Austrian firms) are participating in sub-contracts for Paks II’s construction. Many of these are in civil engineering, manufacturing, or site services. However, concerns have been raised that contracts have often gone to firms close to the ruling Fidesz party. For example, the contract for soil stabilization (worth approx. €110 million) attracted bids from several firms, and the leading candidate was Duna Aszfalt. Duna Aszfalt, owned by László Szíjj, frequently partners with companies of Lőrinc Mészáros and is considered part of the Orbán government’s business circle. Another bidder was A-Híd Zrt., owned by the Apáthy family, which also often teams up with Mészáros-linked firms. These connections raised suspicions that politically connected contractors are favored. (Indeed, investigative reporting found that Duna Aszfalt was widely seen as the “preferred candidate” for the soil works. Ultimately, Hungarian firms did perform extensive groundworks and construction of auxiliary facilities on-site.)

Orgenergostroy (Russia): One significant contractor on-site has been Orgenergostroy, a Russian engineering company with a long history in nuclear construction. Orgenergostroy (founded 1955) operates internationally as a frequent Rosatom subcontractor – it has worked on projects in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and more. In Paks II, Orgenergostroy was responsible for building out the construction infrastructure (the “staging area” – temporary facilities, roads, utilities for the construction period) under Atomstroyexport’s lead. In late 2024, however, Orgenergostroy’s role began to unravel. The firm started mass layoffs of hundreds of workers at Paks II – including Russian, Kazakh, Turkish, and Hungarian staff – and sources indicated Rosatom may replace the company. By early 2025 it was reported that Orgenergostroy had been implicated in a corruption scandal in Russia (see Section 4), possibly explaining its loss of favor. Rosatom confirmed that Orgenergostroy’s work was on schedule but acknowledged workforce adjustments were “the subcontractor’s competency”. If Orgenergostroy exits, Rosatom will likely install another subcontractor for the remaining civil works – a sign of internal shake-ups within the contractor structure.

Financing Partners: The financial architecture is largely tied to Russian state financing, but it’s worth noting the Hungarian government contracted international consultants for financial and legal advice. One notable partner was Rothschild & Co, hired in 2018 for €8.4 million to advise on the Russian loan and project finances. This indicates Hungary sought Western expertise to navigate the complex loan agreement with Russia. As of 2023, due to delays, Hungary negotiated a delay in loan repayment – pushing the start of repayments from 2026 to 2031 – to ease the burden while the plant is still unbuilt. This amendment signals the financial terms of the project have also evolved alongside construction delays.

Construction site of the Paks II nuclear plant expansion (2023). Rosatom’s subcontractors have built out roads, foundations, and a “staging area” to prepare for the reactor buildings. The two VVER-1200 reactor units will be erected adjacent to the existing Paks reactors.

Profiles of Key Figures Associated with Paks II

Hungarian Figures

Viktor Orbán – Prime Minister of Hungary: Orbán is the political architect of Paks II. He negotiated directly with Putin to launch the project in 2014, opting for a Russian deal without open tender. Orbán portrays Paks II as vital for Hungary’s energy security and utility price stability, and he has defended it staunchly even amid criticism. In 2023, facing uncertainty due to the Ukraine war, Orbán personally insisted on sticking with Rosatom when some in his government floated alternatives. His long-running strategy of balancing East and West is exemplified by Paks II – a Russian-led project inside an EU country. Orbán’s government also pushed through the secrecy law shielding Paks II documents for 30 years, underscoring the project’s politically sensitive nature.
Péter Szijjártó – Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Szijjártó is the point man for Paks II in Orbán’s cabinet today. His ministry took over the project’s supervision in 2022, and he frequently meets Rosatom officials and negotiates adjustments. Szijjártó is an outspoken defender of the project on the international stage – he criticized Germany for stalling Siemens’ role on ideological grounds and vows to veto any EU sanctions that would affect Paks II. In November 2023, Szijjártó and Rosatom’s Likhachev signed a new construction schedule agreement, with Szijjártó declaring “it will be built” and lauding Paks II as Europe’s largest ongoing nuclear project. He often cites the involvement of dozens of Western firms to argue the project is truly international, not just Russian. Under Szijjártó’s watch, key milestones like manufacturing of reactor vessels and turbines have been announced, and he remains the chief liaison between Budapest and Moscow for this venture.
János Süli – former Minister without Portfolio for Paks II: Süli, an electrical engineer who once managed the existing Paks NPP, was brought into Orbán’s government in 2017 to oversee the nuclear expansion. He shepherded the project through the EU approval phase and early site works. Described as a pragmatic technocrat, Süli often reassured the public that the new units would be completed “on time” – at one point projecting operation by 2032. However, internal conflicts emerged between Süli and his subordinates. Notably, State Secretary Attila Aszódi (see below) clashed with Süli in 2018 over project changes that appeared to accommodate Rosatom’s requests. Süli sided with the Russian contractor on extending deadlines and other issues, and Aszódi was dismissed. Süli himself left the government in 2022 (when Orbán formed a new cabinet), and Paks II oversight was restructured under Szijjártó. Süli’s tenure highlights the tension between political expediency and technical caution in the project’s management.
Attila Aszódi – nuclear engineer and former State Secretary: Aszódi was the government’s top nuclear advisor from 2014 and was instrumental in planning Paks II’s technical aspects. A professor and pro-nuclear expert, he initially supported the project, helping secure the environmental and safety licenses. By late 2018, however, Aszódi resisted certain decisions – reportedly he opposed schedule compromises that favored Rosatom and raised concerns about meeting safety deadlines. This put him at odds with Minister Süli. In January 2019, Aszódi was abruptly fired, a move that coincided with revelations that his government phone had been selected for targeting with Pegasus spyware during the internal feud. Aszódi’s departure signaled that even within the pro-project camp, there were serious disagreements about pace and procedure. He remains a respected voice on nuclear energy in Hungary, often commenting that Paks II must proceed carefully and meet EU safety norms.
Lőrinc Mészáros – Businessman and Orbán Ally: While not an official on the project, Mészáros is relevant as a symbol of the business-politics nexus surrounding Paks II. Once a small-town gas fitter and a personal friend of Orbán, Mészáros became one of Hungary’s richest men through winning massive public contracts. Companies in his orbit have bid on or won Paks II subcontracts. Investigations found that two of the three Hungarian firms bidding for a major Paks II construction job were closely linked to Mészáros. For example, Duna Aszfalt (run by his associate László Szíjj) and A-Híd Zrt. (run by the Apáthy family, frequent Mészáros partners) were top contenders for the soil improvement works. Mészáros himself acquired a stake in the Hungarian energy sector (owning companies in electricity and pipeline construction), so his enterprises stand to benefit from Paks II’s ancillary work. Critics cite his involvement as evidence of cronyism – that Orbán’s inner circle profits from major investments. While Mészáros has no formal role in Paks II decision-making, his influence exemplifies how Hungary’s oligarchs are interwoven with strategic projects.
Ákos Hadházy – Opposition Politician and Whistleblower: Hadházy is a Hungarian independent MP known for uncovering corruption. He has closely monitored Paks II and provided on-the-ground updates. In late 2024, Hadházy publicly exposed that Orgenergostroy had halted works and fired staff at Paks II, prompting media scrutiny. He has also been a vocal critic of the 30-year secrecy law and has called for transparency in the Rosatom deal. While not part of the project, Hadházy’s role highlights domestic oversight (or lack thereof) – much of what is known about irregularities has come from opposition figures like him. His findings forced Paks II officials to confirm problems (such as the Orgenergostroy layoffs) that were initially kept quiet. Hadházy represents the section of Hungarian society deeply skeptical of the project’s opaque nature and Russian ties.

Vladimir Putin – President of Russia: Putin made Paks II possible by offering Hungary a favorable deal at a time when Western companies were also vying for nuclear projects. His support for Rosatom’s export of nuclear plants is a tool of Russian foreign policy – securing influence in Europe’s energy sector. The Paks II agreement was signed in his presence in Moscow in 2014, just weeks before Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Despite geopolitical fallout since then, Putin and his administration have remained committed to Paks II as a showcase of continued Russia-Hungary cooperation. Putin has met Orbán regularly (almost annually pre-war), and Paks II is often on the agenda as a geopolitical statement that Russia is still welcome in Hungary when much of Europe has turned away. In essence, Putin’s role is as the top-level guarantor of the project – his government underwrites the loan and shields Rosatom from any wavering on the Russian side.
Sergey Kiriyenko – former CEO of Rosatom: Kiriyenko headed Rosatom from 2005 to 2016 and was the key Russian executive who negotiated the Paks II deal. He and Hungarian minister Zsuzsanna Németh signed the intergovernmental agreement in January 2014, locking in Rosatom’s expansion of Paks. Kiriyenko, a former Russian Prime Minister, was a driving force behind Rosatom’s aggressive international expansion. Under his leadership, Rosatom not only secured Paks II but also projects in Turkey, India, Iran, and elsewhere. In 2016, Putin promoted Kiriyenko to a top Kremlin role (he is now a Deputy Chief of Staff), but he remains influential over Rosatom’s strategy. Kiriyenko’s involvement gave Paks II strong backing from the Kremlin early on. Notably, he was often seen as a moderate figure in Russia; his personal rapport with Orbán’s team in 2013 was facilitated by intermediaries (see Klaus Mangold below). Kiriyenko’s legacy in Paks II is that he locked in a long-term dependency: Hungary will rely on Rosatom technology and services well into the 21st century.
Alexei Likhachev – CEO of Rosatom: Likhachev took over Rosatom in late 2016 after Kiriyenko’s departure. He has since been the public face of Rosatom for the Paks project. Likhachev has visited Hungary multiple times; in May 2023 he met Orbán in Budapest to reassure that Rosatom can deliver despite the war and sanctions. Under his tenure, Rosatom had to adapt the Paks contract to changing conditions (swapping out Western partners, adjusting financing schedules). Likhachev negotiated the 2023 contract amendments with Szijjártó and later accompanied the delivery of key components. He openly acknowledged “the international environment is not exactly friendly towards Rosatom” but vowed to complete Paks II “to the maximum despite external pressure”. Likhachev frequently cites Rosatom’s track record – pointing out that four VVER-1200 units are running in Russia and others in Belarus, etc., to instill confidence. Under his leadership, Rosatom also had to endure the loss of another EU project (Finland’s Hanhikivi plant, canceled in 2022), making Paks II Rosatom’s only active new-build in the EU – a project Likhachev is evidently keen to preserve.
Gennady Sakharov – Rosatom Official (Director of Capital Investments): Sakharov is a high-ranking Rosatom executive whose name hit headlines due to a corruption scandal. In March 2024, Sakharov was arrested by a Moscow court for taking bribes in connection with Rosatom’s contracting. Specifically, Russian prosecutors alleged that Sakharov accepted a 32.6 million ruble (approx €320,000) bribe in exchange for awarding contracts to Orgenergostroy. In January 2025, Sakharov pleaded guilty to bribery charges in a Russian court. This case directly involves Paks II: Orgenergostroy’s subcontract at Paks was reportedly the context of the bribe. Sakharov’s role was essentially overseeing capital projects (like Paks) at Rosatom, so his implication in a kickback scheme underscores corruption risks within Rosatom’s ranks. He now faces up to 15 years in prison under Russian law. Rosatom has not publicly linked the scandal to Paks II, but the timing coincided with Orgenergostroy’s removal from the project, suggesting the affair had ripple effects on Paks II’s contractor lineup.
Elgudzhi Kokosadze – Orgenergostroy Deputy CEO: Kokosadze was the First Deputy CEO of Orgenergostroy and the other protagonist in the bribery case. He was the one who paid the bribe to Sakharov (the 32.6 million rubles) to secure Rosatom’s business. Kokosadze was not arrested, but he also admitted guilt and is being prosecuted in Moscow (under travel restrictions). Both Sakharov and Kokosadze admitting to the charges is notable – it suggests Russian authorities are cracking down, perhaps to make an example amid international scrutiny. For Paks II, Kokosadze’s actions meant that Orgenergostroy’s contract was tainted by corruption from the start. This scandal casts a shadow on the fairness of Rosatom’s procurement: Hungarian observers wonder if similar under-the-table dealings affected other Paks contracts. Kokosadze’s fate will likely be decided in Russian courts in 2025, but in the meantime Orgenergostroy’s prospects in Paks II (and Rosatom’s other projects) have dimmed greatly.
Klaus Mangold – Intermediary “Mr. Russia”: Mangold is a German businessman often described as an informal power broker in European deals with Russia. Though neither Hungarian nor Russian, he played a pivotal intermediary role in the Paks II saga. Mangold used his extensive contacts to arrange the crucial 2013 meeting between Viktor Orbán and Rosatom’s Sergey Kiriyenko, where the outline of the Paks II deal was decided. A former Daimler-Benz executive with deep ties in Russia (hence the moniker “Mr. Russia”), Mangold went on to lobby for the project in Brussels, smoothing over EU skepticism. The Hungarian government valued his services highly: in late 2021, Mangold was given a consultancy contract worth HUF 8.2 billion (≈€20+ million) by Hungary’s Innovation Ministry. This contract indicates he was advising on navigating EU regulations and perhaps on financing structures. Mangold’s involvement shows that high-level backchannel diplomacy was at work – he leveraged his credibility to bolster the Hungary-Russia partnership when it faced international scrutiny. Many credit Mangold’s behind-the-scenes influence as a key reason the Paks II agreement came together so swiftly. He exemplifies the often unseen facilitators who drive such international deals.

Corruption Allegations and Transparency Issues

From its inception, the Paks II project has been dogged by allegations of non-transparency and favoritism. The initial decision to award the contract to Rosatom directly raised immediate red flags. Critics noted that no open tender was held – a violation of typical EU public procurement norms. The Hungarian government argued that it was a sovereign strategic project, but the European Commission investigated this no-bid deal for months. In the end, the Commission allowed the project to proceed (citing member states’ freedom to choose their energy mix) but only after Hungary committed to involve other companies in subcontracts and to market-based conditions. The lack of competitive bidding at the top level is frequently cited as a corruption risk, as it forgoes price discovery and favors a politically chosen partner.

Transparency took a further blow in 2015 when the Hungarian Parliament passed an amendment classifying virtually all data related to Paks II for 30 years. This included feasibility studies, contract details, and technical specifications – shielding them from public view and even from parliamentary scrutiny. Government officials claimed such secrecy was necessary for national security and in line with practices in France or Finland, for example, to protect nuclear industry trade secrets. However, Hungarian civil society and opposition parties were alarmed. A coalition of NGOs (including the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) petitioned the President to veto the law, warning that it “severely limits access to public interest data” on a huge investment. Opposition lawmakers lambasted the move: MP Timea Szabó said it created a perfect breeding ground for corruption, essentially legalizing a “gigantic robbery” of public funds. Despite protests, the secrecy law took effect. Ever since, transparency advocates have had to fight for even basic information – for instance, contract modifications or consultant fees only come to light through leaks or EU disclosures, not through Hungarian government releases.

There have also been irregularities in subcontracting and consulting. As mentioned, investigative journalists found that Hungarian companies close to the ruling party were positioned to win lucrative subcontracts. In one case, the tender for soil stabilization works was quietly re-launched and then cancelled without explanation, after a bidder protest. This lack of clarity on why tenders are halted or how winners are chosen fuels suspicions of political interference. Moreover, in 2017 it emerged that the Hungarian government had hired the influential lobbyist Klaus Mangold (see above) as a consultant without disclosure, and only admitted it later when the contract’s existence was revealed. Such deals – hiring an intermediary for a hefty sum – raised questions of whether Hungary was essentially paying to “grease the wheels” in Brussels or Moscow.

Perhaps the most concrete corruption case is the Rosatom-Orgenergostroy bribery scandal that unfolded in 2024. The fact that a top Rosatom executive (G. Sakharov) and the deputy of a major contractor admitted to a kickback scheme is a serious warning sign. They confessed that Rosatom awarded contracts to Orgenergostroy in exchange for bribes, which strongly implies that contract allocations were not merit-based but rather influenced by under-the-table payments. While this case is being prosecuted in Russia, its ripple effect in Hungary is significant. It suggests that Hungarian authorities and the project company may have been unaware (or willfully blind) to corrupt practices happening within their project. Independent MP Ákos Hadházy seized on this, arguing that this is exactly why secrecy is dangerous – if everything were transparent, such corruption would be harder to conceal. The scandal coincided with the termination of Orgenergostroy’s involvement at Paks II, indicating a cleanup effort. But skeptics wonder if this is just the tip of the iceberg, and if other contracts might have been similarly tainted by graft.

In Hungary’s domestic context, the Paks II deal has often been referenced in the same breath as other Orbán-era corruption controversies. For example, in 2014 the U.S. government even banned certain Hungarian officials from entry over corruption concerns (though not explicitly tied to Paks II, it was the backdrop of growing Western unease). The project’s opacity made it a focal point for opposition campaigns: they highlight that the exact repayment terms of the Russian loan, the profitability projections, and many contractor agreements remain secret. Transparency International Hungary warned that Paks II exemplifies state capture risks, where a single project can entrench foreign influence and domestic elite enrichment away from public accountability. In response, government officials insist everything is above-board – pointing to EU approvals as evidence that nothing illegal is occurring. They also note that the project is subject to Hungarian audit institutions (though critics counter that those institutions are politically aligned with the government).

In summary, Paks II has inherited many classic corruption risk factors: a foreign government partner keen to secure influence, a domestic political leadership centralizing the project and limiting oversight, huge contract values with minimal transparency, and signs of crony companies benefiting. This combination has made Paks II a lightning rod in debates about Hungary’s eastward orientation and the health of the rule of law in large investments.

Geopolitical Concerns and International Reactions

European Union Scrutiny: As an EU member state building critical infrastructure with Russia, Hungary came under extensive EU scrutiny for Paks II. The European Commission’s aforementioned investigations were one dimension – ensuring compliance with single market rules. Beyond those, Austria emerged as a persistent opponent. Austria – staunchly anti-nuclear and a neighbor to Hungary – filed a lawsuit in 2018 to annul the Commission’s approval of Paks II’s state aid. The case argued that subsidizing nuclear power (especially with Russian involvement) ran counter to EU energy independence and competition principles. In 2022, Europe’s General Court dismissed Austria’s challenge, affirming that member states can choose nuclear and that the Commission had not erred. Austrian Climate Minister Leonore Gewessler reacted strongly, calling the decision “a slap in the face” and warning that it’s extremely concerning for Russia to be involved in an EU country’s critical infrastructure. Austria appealed this further to the European Court of Justice. In a final blow to Austria’s efforts, the ECJ’s Advocate General recommended upholding the dismissal (as of late 2023), effectively greenlighting Paks II from a legal standpoint. Nonetheless, Austria’s campaign made Paks II a European issue – highlighting fears of nuclear accidents, waste, and geopolitical dependency. Austria also signaled it would monitor compliance with environmental rules, and indeed Austrian NGOs participated in the environmental licensing hearings early on, though Hungary issued the permit over their objections.

Within the EU, Paks II has contributed to broader debates on Russian influence. Since the war in Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states have pressured for sanctions on Rosatom and Russia’s nuclear fuel supply. Hungary, backed by France, has blocked these sanctions. Budapest openly says it will veto any EU measure that would impede nuclear cooperation with Russia. This puts Hungary at odds with many allies, but Orbán has leveraged the EU’s unanimity requirement to shield Paks II. The Hungarian government has argued that nuclear energy is purely a sovereignty issue, not a security threat, despite Rosatom’s controversial role in places like the Zaporizhzhia plant in Ukraine (which Rosatom personnel have been accused of helping occupy). Some EU officials privately voice that Hungary’s stance undermines European solidarity – effectively giving Putin a loophole in the sanctions regime by exempting nuclear trade.

NATO and U.S. Concerns: The United States has viewed Paks II with wariness since its inception. Under the Obama administration, diplomats quietly expressed disappointment that Hungary did not hold an open tender that could have given American or other Western companies a shot (Westinghouse had shown interest in reactor deals in Eastern Europe). By 2014-2015, U.S. officials publicly criticized Hungary’s drift toward Russia in energy. In 2019, under the Trump administration, this concern was muted (Trump and Orbán shared a conciliatory stance toward Russia), but it resurged under President Biden. The Biden administration in its final days (late 2020 to January 2021) imposed certain export restrictions and sanctioned Russian entities that indirectly affected nuclear cooperation. Szijjártó blamed “restrictions rolled out in the last days of the Biden administration” for adding difficulties to Paks II – likely referring to tightened rules on technology transfers. In 2023, the U.S. also sanctioned the Russia-controlled International Investment Bank (IIB) in Budapest, labeling it a Kremlin “spy bank,” which forced Hungary to quit that bank. Right after that episode, Szijjártó hurried to announce that Hungary remains fully committed to Paks II despite U.S. pressure. American officials have also voiced concerns that a Russian-built nuclear plant could pose long-term security vulnerabilities (e.g., reliance on Russian fuel or services for decades, or even espionage risks if Russian personnel are present). These concerns are usually communicated behind closed doors given the sensitivity of nuclear cooperation.

Geopolitical Balancing – The French Role: A notable twist in the Paks II story is France’s growing role. As detailed earlier, French companies (Framatome and EDF) are now deeply involved in supplying key components. This has had diplomatic repercussions: Hungary has actively courted France as an ally to legitimize Paks II within the EU. Prime Minister Orbán and President Emmanuel Macron have discussed the project, and France’s assent was critical to reconfiguring the Siemens-Framatome deal in 2023. Paris has its own reasons to engage – France champions nuclear energy in Europe and opposes penalties on it. Observers note that Hungary “appears to be relying more strongly on Paris” since Germany turned more critical, hoping France will “better understand” Hungary’s close relations with Russia. Indeed, both France and Hungary stood firmly together to exclude nuclear fuel and technology from successive EU sanctions packages. For Hungary, having a West European power on board Paks II is a geopolitical asset: it dilutes the narrative that this is just Hungary and Russia acting alone. For France, supporting Paks II is a way to support its own nuclear industry and keep a line open to Moscow in the nuclear field.

Regional and Global Implications: The commitment to Paks II while war rages in Ukraine has isolated Hungary to an extent in Europe. Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania – all are seeking nuclear expansion, but none chose Rosatom (Poland explicitly ruled out Rosatom bids for its new plants, and Czechia banned Russian and Chinese bidders for its Dukovany reactor project). Finland’s Hanhikivi project with Rosatom was canceled outright in May 2022 due to security concerns after the invasion. Thus, Hungary stands as the only EU country pressing ahead with a new Russian-built reactor. This singular status gives Moscow significant political leverage. Analysts from OSW (Poland’s Eastern Studies Centre) argue that the Kremlin benefits from maintaining Paks II as it “undermines the coherence of the EU’s energy policy” and keeps Hungary as a potential trojan horse in EU decision-making. It’s a tangible project that binds Hungary closer to Russia for decades (through debt and technical dependence) and complicates EU unity on isolating Russia.

At the same time, Hungary emphasizes that nuclear energy is key to meeting climate goals and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. In Hungarian domestic discourse, officials stress that Paks II will enable the phase-out of coal and cut carbon emissions, while providing cheap, steady power. These arguments resonate with many Hungarians, as the existing Paks plant already provides about 50% of the country’s electricity at low cost. By extending this nuclear capacity, Hungary aims for energy autonomy – ironically, an autonomy that in this case is predicated on a close relationship with Russia. This trade-off – energy security via nuclear vs. geopolitical security vis-à-vis Russia – is at the heart of international commentary on Paks II. It’s a microcosm of the broader dilemma Europe faces: balancing climate, energy needs, and geostrategic considerations.

International Monitoring: The Paks II project is being watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and neighboring states for safety. Austria (even while losing in court) vowed to keep an eye on safety compliance and even hinted at raising issues if any IAEA standards are not met. NGOs like Nuclear Transparency Watch in Europe have held hearings on Paks II’s environmental impacts. So far, Hungary’s nuclear regulator has maintained that the VVER-1200 design meets all EU-required safety standards (the HAEA gave the construction license after an unusually prolonged review in 2022). Any misstep – even a minor incident during construction or operation – could become an international flashpoint given the politics around this project.

In conclusion, Paks II exists at the intersection of Hungary’s national energy strategy, Russian influence, and EU geopolitical tension. Internationally, it has prompted legal challenges, strategic realignments (Hungary toward France, etc.), and has been cited as evidence in debates over whether Hungary is a reliable Western partner or drifting into Moscow’s sphere. As of 2025, the project moves forward, buoyed by Hungarian government resolve and Russian commitment, yet under the wary gaze of allies who remain skeptical of a Kremlin-backed mega-project in the heart of Europe. The coming years – as construction accelerates – will determine if Paks II becomes a triumph of Hungary’s independent energy policy or a cautionary tale of geopolitical vulnerability.

Sources: The information in this report is drawn from a range of Hungarian and international sources, including investigative reports by Direkt36/VSquare, analyses by institutes like OSW, official statements reported by World Nuclear News, Hungarian media (Telex, Daily News Hungary, Atlatszo), and EU/legal documents. These citations provide a factual basis for the complex narrative of Paks II – a project where nuclear engineering meets high politics. The story of Paks II is still unfolding, and it will continue to be shaped by the push and pull of corruption allegations, corporate interests, and international power dynamics outlined above.